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Issues Presented
I. Whether the district court erred in finding that the Tribe had the inherent
sovereign power to take Landuser's land.
II. Whether the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear
Landuser's case for alleged violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
because tribal sovereign immunity did not bar Landuser's claim in federal court.
III. Whether the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear
Landuser's case for alleged violations of the ICRA because that Act impliedly
created a cause of action in federal court.
IV. Assuming that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case, whether
the court erred when it decided to use federal "takings" jurisprudence and not
tribal standards, to determine whether a "taking" had occurred.
Jurisdictional Statement
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1988).
Statement of the Case
Plaintiff-petitioner, Joe Landuser (Landuser), brought this action to challenge
the validity of the defendant-respondent Washteh Indian Tribe's (Tribe) Sacred
Lands Ordinance. Landuser owns and farms 160 acres of fee land .within the
reservation boundaries. The dispute arose when the Washteh Tribal Council
(Council), which derives its power from the Tribe, passed an ordinance
designating certain lands, including Landuser's, as sacred and prohibiting all
commercial activity on those lands. The ordinance denies Landuser all rights to
farm, or otherwise use his fee owned land for commercial purposes, because it
is located on sacred tribal land.
* Andrewi. Bobzien: Law clerk, Native American Program, Oregon Legal Services. Fourth-
year evening division law student, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College. John
H. Martin: Third-year law student, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College.
The NALSA Moot Court competition is an annual appellate advocacy competition focused on
a topic of recent interest in federal Indian law. Participants prepare a brief for a given appellant
and compete in round robin oral arguments hosted by a local NALSA chapter. The authors wish
to thank the University of Utah NALSA for their hospitality in hosting the second annual
competition. The 1995 competition will be hosted by the Oklahoma City University NALSA.
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Landuser initially challenged the ordinance in the Washteh tribal court. He
claimed that the Tribe lacked the civil regulatory jurisdiction to take his land for
a public purpose. Landuser also claimed that even if the Tribe did have the
jurisdiction to take his land, he should receive just compensation for the taking
pursuant to section 1302(5) of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The tribal court found that the Tribe did
have the power to take Landuser's land for a public purpose and that, under
tribad common law, the Tribe's sovereign immunity barred Landuser's ICRA
claim in tribal court. This result effectively denied Landuser any tribal forum
to resolve the merits of his claim.
Landuser subsequently brought this action in the Federal District Court for
the State of Utopia, invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) and the
ICRA. The district court held that (1) the Tribe did have the inherent power to
take Landuser's land, (2) Landuser was allowed to bring his action in the district
court because he had been denied a tribal forum, and (3) the takings issue must
be decided under federal Fifth Amendment jurisprudence rather than by tribal
customs and norms; and under that rule a taking had occurred.
Following that ruling, this Court granted the parties' motions for leave to
appeal the district court's findings.
Argument
L The Tribe Does Not Have Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction To "Take"
Petitioner's Land Incidental to Its Inherent Sovereignty
The Washteh Tribe has no inherent authority to "take" Landuser's property
by prohibiting commercial activity under the Tribe's Sacred Lands Ordinance.
The test of a Tribe's power to exercise civil regulatory jurisdiction pursuant to
its inherent sovereignty over non-Indians on fee lands is clear: The exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal authority over "internal"
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes, and thus cannot
survive without express congressional delegation (hereafter called the
"dependency" rule). Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981);
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 425-26 (1989); South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20
(1993). In addition, when a tribe does not have "exclusive" use of former trust
lands within a reservation, it loses any "incidental" civil regulatory jurisdiction
over such lands. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316-17. Further, as a matter of policy
and democratic principles, allowing a tribe to have civil regulatory jurisdiction
only over its internal affairs is consistent with the concept that a sovereign
should only be able to regulate those who consent to be governed and who have
a political voice in political decisions made by the sovereign.
Under the facts presented, the Tribe's regulation of commercial activity on
Landuser's land is beyond what is necessary for the Tribe to exercise authority
over internal tribal matters and politics. In addition, the Tribe has lost
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"exclusive" use of Landuser's land and therefore any incidental civil regulatory
jurisdiction over his land is lost. The instant case also presents the possibility
of democratic failure should the Tribe be authorized to exercise its regulatory
power over Landuser when he has not consented to tribal authority and does not
have a political voice in tribal politics.
For the foregoing reasons petitioner requests that this Court reverse the
district court's finding that the Tribe has the inherent sovereignty to preclude
Landuser's legitimate use of his fee land.
A. The Tribe's Inherent Sovereignty To Restrict Landuser's Commercial Use
of His Fee Lands Through Tribal Ordinance Is Divested Because Such Civil
Regulatory Power Is Beyond What Is Necessary for the Tribe To Govern
Itself or Control Its Internal Relations
Indian tribes possess limited civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on
non-Indian lands, or in other words over their "external" relations, because a
tribe's ability to regulate such external relations is inconsistent with a tribe's
dependent status. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 564. In Montana, the
Supreme Court focused on whether, and under what conditions, a tribe could
exercise civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian lands. The
specific question was whether the tribe could regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on non-Indian fee lands.
Approaching the issue of inherent sovereignty, the Court examined the
principles set out in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), which
differentiated between regulatory power over external relations (relations with
non-Indians) and internal relations (relations with members of the tribe). The
Court stated that areas in which "implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been
held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe .. " Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (quoting Wheeler,
435 U.S. at 326). The limitations on sovereignty "rest on the fact that the
dependent status of Indian tribes . . . is necessarily inconsistent with their
freedom independently to determine their external relations." Id. The Court
concluded that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation." Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. Montana thus sets out the
general rule for determining when a tribe has exceeded its civil regulatory
jurisdiction while also taking into account the inherent rights of a tribe.
In 1989, the Supreme Court reexamined and reaffirmed the bright-line
"dependency" rule it had developed in Montana. In Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), the Yakima tribe
contended that it had the right to impose its zoning and land use laws on non-
Indians on non-Indian lands. Like the Montana Court, the Brendale plurality
opinion distinguished between inherent sovereignty with respect to internal
relations on the one hand, and external relations on the other. Similar to
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Montana, the Brendale plurality found that inherent sovereignty is divested to
the extent it is inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status - to the extent it
involves a tribe's "external relations." Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425-26 (quoting
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
The Brendale plurality also discussed Montana's two exceptions to the
general divestment of inherent sovereignty. Id. at 428. The second exception
proposes that a tribe may have inherent power to regulate conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when the conduct "threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity ... or the health or welfare of the
tribe." Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (emphasis added).' According
to the Brendale plurality, it is significant that the second Montana exception is
prefaced by the word "may," a qualification which means that tribal authority
"depends on the circumstances." Id at 429. In fact, the Brendale plurality
rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of inherent sovereignty which equated
the tribe's retained sovereignty with a local government's police power as
contrary to Montana itself. Id. Thus, the controlling principle is that a tribe "has
no authority itself by way of tribal ordinance" to regulate the use of fee land
owned by non-Indians. Id. at 430.
On application to the facts in the instant case, it is apparent the Tribe has lost
its inherent sovereignty to exercise civil regulatory jurisdiction over a non-Indian
on non-Indian land. The Tribe's inherent jurisdiction extends only to internal
relations. The Tribe's inherent sovereignty to regulate Landuser's land has been
divested as a result of the Tribe's dependent status. The tribal ordinance
attempts to restrict the use of Landuser's property with a regulation that goes
beyond what is justifiable as necessary for the Tribe to (1) protect tribal self-
government or (2) control internal relations. The Tribe's self governance and
internal control. will not be hindered if Landuser is allowed to continue
commercial activity on his fee land. The Tribe will retain its authority over
elections, tribal membership, and other political and internal matters. Landuser
has, by nature and definition, an "external" relation to the Tribe because he is
a non-member of the Tribe. Supreme Court precedent requires a finding that the
Tribe has been divested of inherent sovereign power to dictate its relation with
Landuser.
As a result of Landuser's "external" relation to the Tribe, the dependent status
of the Tribe precludes the Tribe's ability to regulate Landuser's commercial
activities under the guise of inherent sovereignty.
1. The main cases leading up to Brendale can be reconciled based on consent to tribal civil
jurisdiction through entry onto trust lands. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (holding that tribe had the power to tax transactions
.occurring on trust lands"); Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (holding that tribe did not have civil
jurisdiction over non-Indian lands, but the tribe could regulate non-Indians on "land belonging
to the tribe or held in trust for the tribe"); Merrion v. Jacarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133
(1982) (holding that non-Indian company which had contracted with the tribe and which had
entered on "tribal trust property" was liable for a tribal tax).
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The Tribe will contend that the circumstances of this case fall squarely within
the second exception of Montana, that the Tribe has the inherent power to
regulate Landuser's conduct because the conduct "threatens" or has a "direct"
effect on the "political integrity" and the "health or welfare" of the Tribe. The
Tribe argues that the Ordinance protects an interest (sacred lands) that is
inextricably intertwined with its politics and general well-being; that unlike
white society, Indian culture, spirituality and politics cannot be separated from
each other. However, the Tribe's argument that all aspects of its culture are
interrelated runs counter to the requirement that conduct must have a "direct"
effect on the Tribe's political integrity or health and welfare. To hold otherwise
would allow the Tribe to preclude almost any activity by non-Indians on the
reservation on the premise that all aspects of the Tribe's society are interrelated.
The Tribe also argues that tribes possess "those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn ... by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. The Tribe contends that implicit divestiture of
inherent sovereignty only occurs when such power is inconsistent with the
overriding authority of the United States, as when tribes "seek to... alienate
their lands to non-Indians without federal consent." Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980). However,
Colville did not involve the regulation of fee lands, as is the case here.
Moreover, Colville was an example of the sort of "consensual" relationship that
might support authority over non-Indians on fee land. See supra note 1.
B. The Tribe Cannot Restrict or Regulate Landuser's Legitimate Commercial
Use of His Fee Land Because the Tribe's Authority To Regulate Landuser's
Activities Is Incidental to the Tribe's Power To Exclude Non-Indians from the
Reservation
When the Tribe alienated its land to Landuser, it lost any former right to
"exclusive" use of the land, and with such loss of exclusive use, the Tribe lost
any former "incidental" civil regulatory jurisdiction. South Dakota v. Bourland,
113 S. Ct. at 2316-17. In Bourland, South Dakota sought an injunction to enjoin
the Cheyenne Sioux Tribe from excluding non-Indian hunting and fishing on
non-Indian lands. Id. at 2314. The majority in Bourland repeated the bright-line
"dependency" rule of Montana that tribal sovereignty over non-Indians 'cannot
survive' without congressional delegation. Id. at 2319-20.
As Bourland further explained inherent sovereign powers, when a tribe
alienates lands to non-Indians, it loses any former right to "exclusive" use of
such lands, and with such loss of exclusive use, a tribe also loses any former
"incidental" regulatory jurisdiction. Id, at 2316-17. This reasoning reiterates
prior Court reasoning. Id, at 2317 n. 11 ("Certainly, the power to regulate is of
diminished practical use if it does not include the power to exclude: regulatory
authority goes hand in hand with the power to exclude.") (citing Brendale, 492
U.S. at 423-24). Because alienation of lands to non-Indians is incompatible with
the power to then exclude others from those lands, any incidental power to
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regulate that land is also lost. Thus, when as a result of congressional action,
former trust land are "broadly" opened up to non-Indians, the alienation of those
lands to a non-Indian destroys any previously existing tribal rights to regulate.
Id. at 2318 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 560).
In this case, the Tribe should have lost the authority to regulate Landuser's
commercial use of his land because the Tribe no longer has exclusive control
of Landowner's fee owned land. With the loss of exclusive control of the former
trust lands now owned by Landuser, any incidental authority the Tribe had to
exercise civil jurisdiction over such lands, is necessarily lost.
The Tribe contends that the Bourland Court's reliance on Montana was
inapposite with respect to the resulting rule that the power to regulate is
incidental to the power to exclude, because in Montana the purpose behind
removal of exclusive control by the tribe was different than the purpose behind
removal of exclusive control in Bourland. In Montana the purpose behind
removal of exclusive control was to assimilate Indians into majoritarian culture,
but in Bourland, such purpose was to build a dam. The Tribe attempts to
factually distinguish the purpose behind the resulting removal of exclusive
control in Montana from the corresponding purpose in Bourland, and therefore,
the Tribe argues that the Bourland Court's reliance on Montana was misplaced.
In a nutshell, the Tribe contends that implied divestment of civil regulatory
authority over former trust lands depends on the purpose behind the removal of
exclusive control. However, the Supreme Court disagrees. What truly matters
is the "effect of the land alienation occasioned" by the purpose behind removing
exclusive tribal control. The only pertinent fact is that former trust lands have
now been alienated out of tribal control. With such removal of exclusive
control, any previous incidental Indian rights to regulatory control, is lost.
C. The Tribe Should Not Be Able To "Take" Landuser's Land Because the
Tribe Should Only Be Able To Regulate Individuals Who Consent To Be
Governed and Who Have a Political Voice in Tribal Politics
The preconstitutional underpinnings of Montana, Brendale and Bourland
limit tribal power over nonconsenting non-Indians. The Declaration of
Independence states that "all men are created equal," have "inalienable rights"
of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and, to secure these rights,
governments derive their 'just powers from the consent of the governed." The
Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). The
principle underlying the Declaration of Independence, that governments derive
their power from the governed,' is echoed in the first Indian law case decided
by th- Supreme Court, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). In
Fletcher, the Court stated: "[T]he restrictions upon the right of soil in the
Indians, amount... to an exclusion of all competitors from their markets; and
2. The United States Constitution is an embodiment of this idea.
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the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to the right of governing every
person within their limits except themselves." Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
Justice Johnson thus described the scope of tribal sovereignty to extend only to
the tribal members who consented to tribal jurisdiction as a result of
membership. See O.iphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209
(1978). More recently, in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme
Court indicated that retained tribal sovereignty is but a recognition of tribal
authority over Indians who consent to tribal membership. Id. at 693. Even
though tribal governing and adjudicatory bodies often entail features that may
fairly resolve disputes between tribes and non-Indians, confining tribal
sovereignty to "internal relations" honors the notion of "consent of the
governed," also appropriately termed "popular sovereignty."3 Recognition of
"popular sovereignty" or "consent of the governed" properly allows tribes to
influence their own members who consent to tribal governance by maintaining
tribal membership. Furthermore, non-Indians who do consent to jurisdiction, for
one reason or another, may also be covered by the umbrella of tribal civil
regulatory jurisdiction through this consent. See supra note 1.
Constitutional property law theory also supports the proposition that tribes
should not be able to use sovereignty as a basis to regulate or "take" non-Indian
lands located on reservations, because nonmembers, in essence, have no voice
in tribal politics. Sound theory suggests that property rights are to be regarded
as political rights - that such rights are an indispensable ingredient in an
individual's participation in society's processes for collectively regulating the
conditions of social existence
1I. The District Court Had Jurisdiction over Landuser's Claim Because the
Washteh Tribe's Sovereign Immunity Is Not an Absolute Bar to Federal
Court Jurisdiction
The district court properly modified the Washteh Tribe's sovereign immunity
to suit in federal court because tribal sovereign immunity is a common law
doctrine which courts will and should ignore when equity demands, or certain
countervailing important national interests are at stake. Equity counsels that the
tribal sovereign immunity doctrine should give way in this case because
3. See JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRAcr 16-17 (1947 ed.). Rousseau states:
"It appears... that the act of association contains a reciprocal engagement between the public
and individuals, and that each individual ... is engaged under a double character, that is, as a
member of the Sovereign engaging with the individual, and as a member of the State engaged
with the Sovereign." Id.
4. Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1112 (1981); see Garreaux v. Andrus, 676 F.2d 1206, 1210 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding that a writ
of mandamus, forcing the Secretary of the Interior to consider appellants petition calling for a
secretarial election on the adoption of tribal constitutional amendments, was not in order because
appellant had both the power to pass a resolution by referendum and, the power to vote out tribal
council members).
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Landuser would otherwise be without any forum or remedy to vindicate his
federal Constitutional rights. The instant case involves numerous inequitable
factors which have led at least one other federal court to modify tribal
immunity. Dry Creek Lodge v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682
(10th Cir. 1980). Landuser urges this Court to follow that court's lead and
affirm the lower court decision finding proper jurisdiction to hear Landuser's
case, the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine notwithstanding.
A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Is a Common Law Doctrine Subject to Judicial
Modification When Equity Demands
Tribal sovereign immunity is not an absolute bar to federal court jurisdiction
over Indian tribes. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatoni
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1991).
[T]he Court's holding [in Potawatomi] in effect rejects the argument
that ... the Tribe is completely immune from legal process. By
addressing the substance of the... claim for prospective injunctive
relief against the Tribe, the Court today recognizes that a tribe's
sovereign immunity from actions seeking money damages does not
necessarily extend to actions seeking equitable relief.
Id at 505 (Stevens, L, concurring). Tribal sovereign immunity is thus best
understood as a common law doctrine which federal courts will modify in
certain cases seeking equitable relief, where non-Indians are involved and
countervailing federal interests justify a minimal burden on tribal sovereignty.
It is often stated that "suits against tribes are . . . barred by sovereign
immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation." Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). However, sovereign
immunity, like other legal concepts, is capable of evolution. Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 417-19 (1979). Congress has never enacted any positive law
which establishes tribal sovereign immunity and which would constrain the
evolution of the common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
Tribal sovereign immunity is thus unlike the sovereign immunity enjoyed by
states pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and foreign governments as
established by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§
1601-1611 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Tribal sovereign immunity to suit in federal
or state court is not coextensive with the deceptively, similar Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence which imposes constitutional limits on the abrogation
of state sovereign immunity. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985) (holding that Congress may override Eleventh Amendment
immunity, but its intent to do so must be "unmistakably clear"); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) ("A state may be sued by its own consent.")
Instead, tribal sovereign immunity should be understood as a prudential
limitation on when federal courts will subject tribes to suit in federal court.
288 [Vol. 19
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This limitation is the result of judicial deference to Congress' plenary power
over Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., art. I,
§ 8. Some lower courts, however, have felt that the scope of tribal immunity
was locked in "as it existed at earlier time." In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 595
(9th Cir. 1992). This understanding is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding
in Potawatomi that tribal sovereign immunity did not excuse a tribe from its
obligation to assist in the collection of validly imposed state sales taxes.
Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 512. In Potawatomi, Justice Stevens concurred in the
otherwise unanimous opinion to emphasize that the Court had in effect modified
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity by granting declaratory relief
acknowledging the Oklahoma Tax Commission's right to collect taxes on tribal
sales to non-Indians. Id. at 515.
Potawatomi clarified the law of sovereign immunity with respect to the
collection of sales taxes on Indian lands, but in so doing also illuminated the
circumstances which would justify a federal court in modifying the doctrine.
These circumstances were present in Potawatomi because Congress had never
authorized suits to enforce tax assessments, the state had an interest in assuring
the payment of the taxes and otherwise, violations of the law by those subject
to the tax would go virtually unchecked. Id. at 510, 512. As Justice Stevens
paraphrased it, "I am not sure that the rule of tribal sovereign immunity ...
applies to claims for prospective equitable relief against a tribe." Id. at 515.
Thus the Court's most recent discussion of tribal sovereign immunity in
Potawatomi qualifies the broad statement in Santa Clara Pueblo that tribal
sovereign immunity bars claims for injunctive and declaratory relief for
violations of ICRA. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72. Tribal sovereign
immunity is not an absolute bar to bringing a claim against a tribe in federal
court, especially where, as here, the claim is addressed to the court in equity.
B. In Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence the Supreme Court Has Recognized
that Individual Rights Are an Overriding National Interest Which Compel
Modification of Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court, in the context of the Eleventh Amendment, has
recognized that though sovereign immunity is installed in the Constitution, in
certain instances it must give way to overriding national interests. The Court has
felt compelled to modify state sovereign immunity where important federal
rights are at issue. "Federal Courts have a primary obligation to protect the
rights of the individual that are embodied in the federal Constitution and laws,
... and generally should not eschew this responsibility based on some diffuse,
instrumental concern." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 28 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring). One example of this is the well-recognized irony of
the Ex Parte Young fiction, which allows suits alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment (which declares that "No State shall make any law..
.") to be brought against state officials in their individual capacity, thus avoiding
No. 1]
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the Eleventh Amendment. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).' In the instant
case no such illogical reasoning is required to justify setting aside the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine; rather the court should recognize that in
Landuser's case, the vindication of his personal civil rights as guaranteed by
ICRA outweighs the importance of tribal sovereign immunity to suit in federal
court. The district court recognized that the instant case provided an inequitable
set of facts, that Landuser would otherwise be denied a meritorious resolution
of his claim and thus set aside the Tribe's assertion of tribal sovereign immunity.
This Court should recognize the propriety of that decision and affirm the lower
court.
C. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Not Bar a Claim Under ICRA When
Plaintiff (1) Is a Non-Indian Alleging the Deprivation of Personal and
Property Rights, (2) Would Otherwise Be Without a Forum or Remedy, (3)
The Dispute Is Not Intratribal, and (4) A Federal Forum Would Not
Contravene Any Congressional Policies Underlying ICRA
Federal courts have not found tribal sovereign immunity to bar federal court
jurisdiction of ICRA claims when the plaintiff can show the "absolute necessity"
for a federal forum. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone
Tribes, 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980); accord White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728
F.2d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 1984); Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek)
Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1992).
In Dry Creek, tribal sovereign immunity did not bar an ICRA claim in a case
where the non-Indian owners of Dry Creek Lodge sought to bring suit against
a tribe for blocking the sole road from the lodge to a highway and preventing
access to the lodge. The plaintiffs initially sought relief in the tribal court, but
consent to suit was not given by the tribe. The tribe contended that under Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)6 tribal sovereign immunity is
abrogated under ICRA only in habeas corpus actions. In holding that the federal
district court did have jurisdiction over the suit, the 10th Circuit reasoned that
Santa Clara Pueblo did not apply when a non-Indian does not have a tribal
5. The Court stated in another case regarding the Young doctrine:
The Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme
authority of the United States.'... Er parte Young was the culmination of efforts
by this court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights secured elsewhere in the Constitution.
Pennhurst State ScIL & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1989).
6. In Santa Clara Pueblo, a tribal member's children were denied tribal membership because
a tribal ordinance denied such membership to children of female tribal members who marry
outsiee the tribe, but granted tribal membership to male tribal members who marry outside the
tribe. The plaintiffs, the tribal member mother and her daughter brought suit under ICRA
claiming a violation of "equal protection." The Supreme Court held that ICRA only waived tribal
sovenrign immunity in habeas corpus actions. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 66-67.
[Vol. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/11
SPECIAL FEATURES
forum in which to resolve his dispute. Dry Creek, 623 F.2d at 685. Thus, there
is an exception to the Santa Clara Pueblo holding that tribal sovereign
immunity bars ICRA suits in other than habeas corpus actions.
Dry Creek was a case alleging violations of ICRA which presented those
constellation of factors which led a federal court to decline to recognize tribal
sovereign immunity. Landuser, like the plaintiffs in Dry Creek, is a non-Indian
who has been denied tribal judicial and political forums to adjudicate his ICRA
claims. Federal court jurisdiction, as in Dry Creek, would not disserve Congress'
purpose behind ICRA. Landuser, like Plaintiffs Cook in Dry Creek, would
otherwise be without a forum or remedy to vindicate his rights.
1. If Landuser Would Othenvise Be Without a Forum or Remedy a
Federal Court Should Ignore Sovereign Immunity
Landuser will have neither a forum nor a remedy if a federal court does not
have jurisdiction of this case because the Washteh Tribe's sovereign immunity
bars claims against it in tribal court. Landuser has attempted to resolve this
dispute through all available tribal forums but to no avail. In this respect
Landuser's situation is like that of the plaintiffs in Dry Creek. In Dry Creek,
plaintiffs sought to bring a claim in tribal court alleging a violation of their
rights under ICRA, but the Tribe refused to consent to the jurisdiction of the
tribal court. Both of these cases stand in contrast to the situation presented in
Santa Clara Pueblo, where plaintiffs were free, after being dismissed from
federal court, to pursue their claim in tribal forums.
Landuser will also be bereft of any remedies for the violation of his
constitutional rights unless ICRA is enforced by a federal court. Like the
plaintiffs in Dry Creek, Landuser is a non-Indian who has no representation in
the internal tribal political process, another distinction between the instant case
and the plaintiffs in Santa Clara Pueblo. Thus, without federal court
jurisdiction, not only will he be without an efficient judicial remedy, he will be
without any meaningful remedy to enforce his rights.
2. A Federal Court Should Also Consider that the Personal and Property
Rights of a Non-Indian Are Being Deprived
Landuser's status as a non-Indian is important because it signifies that he
does not have any political voice in the Tribe. The Court's opinion in Santa
Clara Pueblo placed much importance on the fact that plaintiffs Martinez had
access to the political forum of the tribe and its duly elected officials in addition
to tribal court access. The Court was appropriately concerned with infringing
on the right of the tribe to govern itself and maintain authority. Santa Clara
Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59. Unlike that case, Landuser has no such access to the
tribal political process. In Dry Creek, this lack of a political voice militated in
favor of the federal court finding jurisdiction. Dry Creek, 623 F.2d at 685.
Because Landuser has no recourse to either the tribal judicial or political
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forums, tribal sovereign immunity should not bar the jurisdiction of the federal
court over the claim.
3. The Dispute Is Not Intratribal and Federal Court Jurisdiction Is Not at
Odds with Congress' Stated Policies Underlying ICRA
Unlike Santa Clara Pueblo, which involved tribal membership requirements,
the issue in both Dry Creek and the instant case involves a property dispute and
does not involve matters of an intratribal nature or concern only tribal members.
Thus, federal court jurisdiction would not contravene either of Congress' stated
purposes for ICRA. Those policies are (1) to strengthen the position of
individual tribal members vis-li-vis the tribe and (2) to promote the federal
policy of furthering Indian self government. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at
62.
Adjudicating in federal court the question of whether the Tribe's ordinance
worked a taking does not present the same likelihood of undermining tribal
authority as did federal jurisdiction in Santa Clara Pueblo. The issue in the
instant case concerns the Tribe's external relations with nonmembers and non-
Indians. This relationship does not implicate the same type of "self government"
concerns as did the issue of tribal membership standards in Santa Clara Pueblo.
The Court's view of tribal "self government" concerns should be influenced by
the limits set on inherent tribal sovereignty. Tribal zoning ordinances impacting
non-Indians are just the type of "external" issues which are not left to tribal
discretion. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 445.
Furthermore, this case is similar to Dry Creek in that Landuser did not
attempt to circumvent a tribal forum, but instead sought his initial remedy with
the Tribe. Federal jurisdiction would thus not be at odds with Congress' policy
of supporting tribal court development because any undermining of the authority
of tribal forums has resulted from the Washteh Tribe's own failure to provide
such forums.
111. ICRA Impliedly Creates a Cause of Action for Non-Indian Landowners
who Allege a Taking of Private Property and Have Been Denied a Forum
and Remedy in Tribal Court
Admittedly, ICRA does not on its face create a cause of action to redress
violations of its provisions, with the exception of section 1303 authorizing
habeas corpus actions. However, a federal court may look beyond the face of
a statute and find an implied cause of action if congressional intent would
support such a private cause of action. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
179 (1988). Congressional intent may appear implicitly in the language or
structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment. Thompson, 484
U.S. at 179 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 18 (1979)). The Court in Thompson recognized that the implied cause of
action doctrine was not limited to implying only those claims which Congress
actually had in mind but forgot to codify into law, but also would sanction those
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claims which an inferred congressional intent would support. Thompson, 484
U.S. at 179-80. An inquiry into Congress' perception of the problem it was
addressing with ICRA supports the implication of a private cause of action for
Landuser as necessary to effectuate congressional intent. A cause of action
would also be consistent with all stated congressional policies for ICRA.
Congress' intentions for section 1302 of ICRA, as discerned by the Supreme
Court in Santa Clara Pueblo, were twofold. "Two distinct and competing
purposes are manifest in the provisions of ICRA: In addition to its objective of
strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-h-vis the tribe,
Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal policy of
furthering Indian self-government." Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62.
Another central purpose of ICRA was to secure for the American Indian the
broad constitutional rights afforded to other Americans. Id. at 61 (quoting S.
Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1967)).
These congressional policies speak primarily to the relationship between
Indians and their tribes and do not directly implicate non-Indians. Indeed, the
one Supreme Court case which has addressed the issue of implied causes of
action under ICRA referred to non-Indians only once, in a reference to judicial
(not congressional) recognition of the appropriateness of tribal forums for the
adjudication of non-Indian personal and property interests. Santa Clara Pueblo,
436 U.S. at 65. Santa Clara Pueblo is not a dispositive interpretation of
congressional intent regarding the propriety of implying a cause of action for a
non-Indian alleging a violation of section § 1302(5) of the ICRA who has been
denied a forum and remedy in tribal court. Santa Clara Pueblo can be
distinguished from the instant case as one which addressed the propriety of
implying a cause of action for a different class of persons (Indian tribal
members and their children) asserting a different section of ICRA (25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(8)) and where the assertion of the right (equal protection) had a
profoundly different impact on Congress' stated policies.
A. The Context, Language and Congressional Intent for ICRA Favor
hferring a Private Cause of Action
Although there is no mention of non-Indians in Congress' general statements
of intent for ICRA, the statute was intended to benefit non-Indians who live on
reservations. Because Congress intended to secure for Indians the broad
constitutional rights enjoyed by other Americans, it can be inferred that
Congress also intended to extend to non-Indian U.S. citizens living on
reservation those constitutional rights arguably lost as a result of living in Indian
country. The statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5)y also creates a federal right in favor
of Landowner which protects him from having his land taken without just
compensation. A federal cause of action would be consistent with the
7. "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... take any private
property for a public use without just compensation." 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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underlying purposes of the federal scheme. The authority of the Washteh tribal
court would not be undermined in this case because it had the initial opportunity
to address the merits of Landuser's ICRA claim, but chose instead to eviscerate
ICRA in Washteh tribal court. A federal cause of action would not be an undue
or precipitous interference into tribal internal affairs because this dispute
concems the external relations of the Tribe with non-Indians. Arguments by the
Tribe based on the costs of defending against a federal claim are disingenuous
because the Tribe seeks to avoid all avenues which might subject it to legal
liability for taking Landuser's land. Congress' policy of furthering tribal self
government likewise cannot be strenuously argued by the Tribe because to do
so would be to acknowledge no limits on tribal self government. The Washteh
Tribe would in effect be sanctioned to engage in unreviewable restrictive zoning.
This deference to tribal self government is not congressional policy; in fact,
ICRA was intended as a federally imposed limit.on tribal autonomy.
The structure of the statute supports this view. The bill selectively
incorporated and in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights
to accommodate the unique needs and structures of tribal governments. Indeed
the provision at issue in Santa Clara Pueblo, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8),' was
modified to apply only to the tribe's laws, rather than the more expansive "the
laws" of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 64
n.14. In contrast, the takings clause at issue here, section 1302(5) is imported
wholesale from the Fifth Amendment, with a minor change from passive to
active voice. The inference to be drawn from this is that Congress fully
intend.d tribes to be subject to takings claims in the same way state and federal
governments are liable, through private lawsuits and ultimately in federal court.
That Congress explicitly provided for federal habeas corpus relief does not
indicate an intention on the part of Congress to avoid all other avenues to
federal court. A habeas corpus action under ICRA would provide for de novo
review of a tribal court decision. That indicates only the instances in which
Congress intended a federal district court to review a tribal court decision, this
provision says nothing about an instance in which a tribal court has effectively
declined to hear a claim, as is the case here. Congress should be presumed to
have had comity between federal and tribal courts in mind rather than limits on
federal court jurisdiction. In this case a federal court would not be displacing
a tribal court by retrying the merits of a claim already adjudicated by a tribal
court. As the Santa Clara Pueblo Court recognized, ICRA embodies two
countervailing policies and courts should not construe the statute so as to
undermine either of those policies. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 64. Thus,
in this instance, to prevent the extension of constitutional protections over Indian
country from becoming a dead letter, the district court properly granted
juri;diction.
It. "No Indian tribe ... shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws .... " 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
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The cause of action Landuser seeks to have recognized is not one
traditionally relegated to tribal law, instead, the limits of tribal judicial and
regulatory sovereignty have always been a federal question. See South Dakota
v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993) and National Farmers Union Insurance Co.
Inc. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
Inferring a cause of action would not disserve either of Congress' dual
objectives for ICRA. As noted above, a cause of action would not contravene
any of the more specific concerns Congress had in mind when legislating. A
cause of action is crucial, however, to give effect to Congress' objective of
extending Constitutional norms to tribal self government. In this case no tribal
forums are available to vindicate the rights created by ICRA and the district
court properly recognized an implied cause of action.
B. Federal Courts Frequently Infer a Federal Cause of Action for the
Enforcement of Civil Rights
Another factor counselling recognition of a remedy is the Supreme Court's
willingness to utilize federal common law to infer causes of action from the
Constitution and federal statutes to enforce civil rights. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that it is more willing to imply a cause of action when the right
involved is a federal civil right. This is especially true at the Constitutional
level, where courts have implied a cause of action directly from the Constitution
to enforce constitutional provisions. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment). The presumed availability
of federal equitable relief to enforce federally protected rights also exists
independent of explicit congressional authorization. EX Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
The Supreme Court has also sanctioned this more permissive approach when
analyzing whether a cause of action is available pursuant to 42 U.S.C.. § 1983
to remedy violations by state officials of the Constitution and federal laws.
Under this line of cases a court must presume a section 1983 right of action to
exist in a federal statute unless there is evidence on the part of Congress to
foreclose such an action. See Right v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment &
Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987) and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980).
These two lines of authority buttress the traditional view that "the very
essence of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). This reasoning is what induced the court in
Dry Creek to endorse a private cause of action in federal court. "From the
formation of the Union and the adoption of the bill of rights, the United States
has manifested an equally great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the
United States from unwarranted intrusions in their personal liberty." Dry Creek,
623 F.2d at 685 (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
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(1978)). Likewise, the district court in this case properly implied a cause of
action under ICRA not only as means of advancing congressional intent but also
to vindicate the important function of the federal courts to uphold the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
IV. The District Court Was Correct When It Decided as a Matter of Federal
Common Law That the Takings Claim Should Be Decided Under Fifth
Amendment Standards Because Congress Did Not Intend Tribal Law To
Govern and Tribal Law Would Significantly Conflict with Federal Objectives
for ICRA As Well As Be Unconstitutional in This Case
Whether claims alleging violations of section 1302(5) should be decided with
reference to tribal'common law or by federal constitutional standards is a
question of first impression for this Court. The appeals court should first look
to legislative intent to determine the rule Congress meant to apply to takings
under ICRA. The legislative history, general congressional policies, and
language of ICRA support the conclusion that Fifth Amendment standards
should define a taking under section 1302(5). This conclusion is supported by
the reasoning of at least two other federal circuits. Additionally, federal
common law dictates that Fifth Amendment standards should displace tribal
common law because there is a need for a nationwide standard and tribal
common law in this case would be unconstitutional as well as conflict with
Congress' intentions for ICRA. For all these reasons, the district court correctly
applied Fifth Amendment standards to the alleged taking in this case.
A. In Light of the Legislative History of ICRA, Fifth Amendment Standards
Should Provide the Rule of Decision for Section 1302(5)
With ICRA, Congress imposed on the Washteh Tribe restrictions similar to
those contained in the Bill of Rights. Congress' purpose for the bill, and
corresponding intentions regarding the rule of decision to be applied to takings
claims pursuant to section 1302(5), should be discerned first as a matter of
congressional intent. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that if Congress intends a rule, courts
are bound to implement its will). Congress intended to protect individual
Indians, and by inference non-Indians, from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal
governments. This goal was accomplished by placing certain limitations on an
Indian tribe in the exercise of its powers of self-government. "These limitations
are the same as those imposed on the Government of the United States by the
United States Constitution and on the states by judicial interpretation." S. Rep.
No. 841, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 5-6 (1967). Thus, if legislative history is any
guide, Congress intended the Constitution to provide the standards by which
alleged violations of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) are to be judged.
The Tribe may point out that Congress also recognized that some issues
arising under ICRA would depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom
and because Constitutional norms would interfere with the Tribe's ability to
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maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity, Congress thus had
no intention of imposing Constitutional standards on tribes. However, the
imposition of a zoning ordinance which deprives Landuser of the right to farm
his land is the quintessence of an "external" matter. Matters external to the
Tribe were not intended by Congress to be subject to tradition and custom: As
a general principle the interpretation of ICRA should parallel the constitutional
interpretation where the tribal procedure parallels that of the larger American
society. Cf. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir.
1976); Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir.
1988) ("The Tribe should take the tail with the hide."). A zoning ordinance is
a prototypical modern legislative technique and has such a wide reaching effect
that Congress did not intent its solicitude for tribal customs to extend to this
"external" activity.
B. In Light of the Similarity in Language Between Section 1302(5) and the
Fifth Amendment, Fifth Amendment Standards Should Provide the Rule of
Decision for Section 1302(5)
The limitations imposed by, and the very language of section 1302(5) is
virtually identical to that in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, with the
one difference that the clause is stated in the active voice in ICRA and in the
passive voice in the Constitution. Because ICRA purported to give Indians
constitutional rights which other Americans enjoy, and the language at issue in
this case does not deviate in any meaningful way from the right as it is stated
in the U.S. Constitution, the district court was correct in applying the
constitutional standard.
C. Two Federal Circuits Hold That Fourth Amendment Standards Govern the
Conduct of Tribal Officials Under ICRA Section 1302(2) (Search And
Seizure) Because of the Legislative History of ICRA and the Similarity
Between That Section and the Analogous Constitutional Provision
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have addressed the same question presented
here, but in the context of subsection 1302(2) of the ICRA. That subsection
secures the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizures, among other protections. These circuits have found the search and
seizure provision of ICRA to impose the analogous Fourth Amendment standard
on tribes. United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Strong, 778 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Tracy v. Superior Court, 810
P.2d 1030, 1046 (Ariz. 1991). In reaching that conclusion, those Circuits
reasoned that the striking similarity between the two provisions and the
legislative history of ICRA provided evidence that Congress intended that
provision to be governed by Fourth Amendment standards. No evidence could
be found which would militate in favor of affording any less protection.
Likewise, the district court in the instant case properly applied the Fifth
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Amendment constitutional standard to disputes under section 1302(5) because
Congress evinced no intention to entrust the definition of a taking to tribal law.
D. Tribal Common Law Should Not Govern Section 1302(5) Because There
Is a Need for a Nationwide Standard and the Application of Tribal Law
Would Frustrate Specific Objectives of the Statute
A court should endeavor to fill the interstices of a federal remedial scheme
with uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question evidences a
distinct need for nationwide legal standards. Kamen v. Kemper Financial
Sevices, 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991). There is a need for a uniform federal
definition of a taking under ICRA so that all landowners who hold land in fee
simple on Indian reservations based on patents from the U.S. government are
governed by the same standards. Landowners, especially non-Indians, receiving
land in fee from the U.S. government could in no way foresee that, pursuant to
a f deral statute, the extent of their property interests would be subject to the
discretion of a sovereign not bound by the Constitution. The law governing
section 1302(5) should be defined by the U.S. Constitution because the patent
holders expected that their rights and obligations would be governed by such
standards. Cf. Kamen, 111 S. Ct. at 1717 (holding that where private parties
enter legal relationships based on the expectation that state law standards govern
their rights and obligations, state law is presumed incorporated into federal
common law.). To do otherwise would be to undermine their reasonable
expectations and undermine the rule of law.
E. Tribal Common Law, When Applied as a Federal Rule of Decision, Must
Conform to the Constitution
The courf of appeals should also note that because ICRA is a federal statute,
any common law rule, such as the Washteh tribal common law, incorporated as
federal common law necessarily becomes federal in character. Kamen, 111 S.
Ct. at 1717. Recognition of this fact serves to highlight one anomaly in the
Tribe's reasoning. If the tribal law is incorporated as federal law, the tribal
ordinance is admittedly held not to work a taking. In contrast, the ordinance
would amount to a taking under federal constitutional standards. Under the
Tribe's proposed scheme a federal rule of decision applied pursuant to a federal
statute would not have to conform to the U.S. Constitution. This is an arguably
unconstitutional result under the durable principle that no federal law may
contravene the Constitution, first stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803). Thus, the district court was correct in declining to apply
the tribal common law to this case.
F. The Application of Tribal Law Would Present a Significant Conflict with
Federal Policy Underlying ICRA and Would Frustrate Congress' Objectives
The application of tribal law would frustrate ICRA's stated objective of
extending constitutional rights to both Indians and non-Indians. To allow the
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Washteh Tribe to craft its own definition of a taking would be to allow it to
evade the strictures of ICRA at will. No court would ever be compelled to find
a taking and as a result ICRA would be rendered nugatory as it applies to the
Washteh Tribe. This result would be a significant conflict with stated
congressional intent for ICRA.
Federal common law will displace state law when significant conflicts exist
between an identifiable federal policy or specific objectives of federal legislation
and the operation of state law. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S.
at 507, 511. This reasoning applies to the analogous choice between a federal
or tribal rule of decision. Because the operation of tribal standards would
significantly conflict with the objective of strengthening the position of
individuals vis-h-vis the tribe, as a matter of federal common law, the tribal
common law cannot govern this dispute. Thus, the district court judge properly
held that tribal common law must be displaced by federal constitutional
standards.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Landuser asks that this Court find the district
court erred in finding that the Tribe had the inherent power to "take" Landuser's
fee land. Landuser also requests that this Court affirm the district court findings
that federal jurisdiction existed and that the Fifth Amendment, not tribal
common law, provided the rule of decision.
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